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ABSTRACT 
Software protection is an essential aspect of information security to 
withstand malicious activities on software, and preserving valuable software 
assets. However, software developers still lack an effective methodology for 
the assessment of deployed protections, especially in the area of mobile 
applications. To solve these issues, we present a novel attack simulation 
based software protection assessment method to evaluate and compare 
different protection solutions. Our solution relies on Petri Nets to specify 
and visualize attack models of mobile applications. We developed a Monte 
Carlo based approach to simulate attacking processes and to deal with the 
uncertainty. Then, based on this simulation, a novel protection comparison 
model is proposed to compare different protection solutions. Finally, our 
attack simulation based software protection assessment method is presented. 
   
We illustrate our method by means of a case study process to demonstrate 
that our approach can provide a suitable software protection assessment for 
developers and software companies. 
Keywords: Mobile Software Security; Software Protection Assessment; 
Attack Simulation; Monte Carlo Method; Petri Net 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, software is an extremely important asset for customers to support 
and execute their businesses. Consequently, software protection has 
attracted much attention from developers and software companies in terms 
of software security, like the anti-piracy, binary analysis, and so on. To 
ensure security against malicious software attacks, many tools have been 
developed, such as data obfuscation, tamper-proofing, code splitting, 
software watermarking, among others (Falcarin et al., 2011).  
In this regard, assessing the effectiveness of these protections is crucial 
before embedding them into real commercial software products. In 
particular, in practical use cases, like mobile computing, multiple protection 
methods could be utilised together as Protection Solutions (PSs) to thwart 
actual threats. For example, in the area of Android APP development, it is 
important to consider different attack risks on one single APP: some 
attackers try to steal the encryption key in the APP execution, others may 
focus on the illegal tampering to obtain improper utilisations, etc. Therefore, 
a software protection assessment method needs to be able to assess potential 
PSs with respect to various types of attacks. This is the context where this 
paper takes place.   
Currently, one main type of software protection assessment (Ceccato et al., 
2014) focuses on the evaluation of individual protection methods and does 
not consider PSs with multiple protection methods. Another kind of 
software protection assessment (Basile et al., 2013) discussed general 
software measurement frameworks for protection, and did not involve PSs 
either. Hence, none of these two approaches is suitable for protection 
assessment in terms of complex PSs to provide convincing results.  
Besides, for real software attack processes, uncertainty is another challenge 
for these existing assessment methods. In uncertain software attacking 
processes, there are many random variables and factors involved, such as 
the computing resources for attacking, the decisions or selections made by 
particular attackers, and so on. Moreover, specific environments, like 
mobile computing, could jeopardise this uncertainty by the fragmentation of 
   
mobile OS. To capture this phenomenon, we could use a non-deterministic 
attack simulation based on the Monte Carlo method to describe the real 
uncertain software attacking processes. This idea will be the basic tool for 
our proposed method.  
Petri Net (PN) based attack models are suitable objects to model software 
attacks (Murata et al., 1989; Wang et al., 2013), and in this work we use 
them to support software protection assessment in terms of Monte Carlo 
based attack simulation.  
In real software protection implementations, assessing every possible PSs in 
each specific software protection scenario is a huge task, considering the 
myriad of possible combinations of various PSs (multiple protection 
methods with their parameters) and various software protection scenarios 
(multiple attacks with weights). Hence, the relations (comparing results) 
among PSs under protection assessments are particularly valuable for this. 
Our assessment method can use a comparison model to manage the 
comparisons among PSs on the basis of the attack simulation. As such, the 
protection comparison model is the central component of our assessment 
methodology. 
To summarize our approach, our novel Attack Simulation based Software 
Protection Assessment Method (ASSPAM) uses a Monte Carlo based Attack 
Simulation (MCAS) to simulate specific software attack processes with 
implementing PSs, based on PN based attack models. Then, using the results 
obtained from the MCAS, our Attack Simulation based Protection 
Comparison Model (ASPCM) provides a numeric estimation of the PS and 
thus this can be compared in the ASSPAM to search for the best PS. Besides, 
various protection scenarios will be discussed to implement ASSPAM in the 
real world. 
This research has been carried out within the European FP7 project ASPIRE, 
Advanced Software Protection: Integration, Research, and Exploitation 
(ASPIRE, 2016). Our method focuses on the assessment of PSs, and does 
not cover the generation and optimisation of these PSs. Some other 
components of ASPIRE can store security experts’ knowledge and 
experiences in the Knowledge Base, and generate PSs by means of 
reasoning technique. Besides, to generate and optimise PSs, there are some 
aspects, such as the cost of protections, the dependency among protection 
methods, and so on, which are out of the scope of this paper.  
Furthermore, compared to traditional PNs (Murata et al., 1989), our PN 
based attack models focus on attack steps (transitions) with related 
simulation information for assessment. Therefore, some features in 
traditional PNs are not involved in this paper, such as tokens and liveness. 
   
PNs with full characteristics will be utilised by other software protection 
assessment approaches in the ASPIRE project. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work. Section 
3 discusses preliminary concepts and background. In Section 4, our new 
method is proposed. In Section 5, we use a protection assessment instance to 
demonstrate that our proposed method can provide suitable protection 
assessments for mobile software protection. Section 6 concludes this paper 
and points out future work. 
2. RELATED WORK 
This section introduces existing research progress in the areas of software 
analysis and measurement, attack modelling, Monte Carlo simulation and 
software protection assessment.  
2.1 Software Analysis and Measurement 
Software analysis and measurement are important areas in software 
engineering (Briand et al., 1996). For example, in the software process 
improvement area, measurement has been emphasised as a central function 
and activity (Cheng, 2012). In the field of object-oriented design, software 
metrics provide the suitable approach to measure the software development 
processes (Chidamber et al., 1994). From a software security viewpoint, 
Tonella et al. (2014) presented a general framework to assess a software by 
various measurable features and metrics to withstand software attacks. 
Related software analysis and measurement mechanisms are valuable 
references for our software protection assessment.   
2.2 Attack Modelling  
Currently, attack modelling is an important area of information security 
(Sgandurra et al., 2016). Attack Tree models and Attack Graphs are widely 
used for representing network attacks, virus attacks, and so on (Dewri et al., 
2007; Sheyner et al., 2002). For example, the scalable modelling process is 
studied for attack graph generation with logic formalism in (Ou et al., 2006). 
However, none of them can precisely describe preconditions, actions and 
external impacts in software attack processes properly. 
In this regard, Petri Nets (PNs) were originally introduced as a modelling 
technique for concurrent systems (Murata et al., 1989). These nets can 
model specific cyber-physical attacks on smart grid (Chen et al., 2011). In 
the formal way, security policies can be verified by Coloured Petri Nets 
(Huang et al., 2010). Taking software protection as objective, Wang et al. 
   
(2013) focused on coloured PN based attack modelling. As discussed in 
Section 1, PN based attack models are suitable to describe preconditions, 
post-conditions and actions and, therefore, they will play a core role in our 
attack modelling and protection assessment. 
2.3 Monte Carlo Simulation 
The Monte Carlo simulation (method) is a powerful tool for dealing with 
uncertainty and probability (Raychaudhuri et al., 2008). It is very useful for 
analysing and simulating complex systems and problems, due to its 
flexibility and error-quantifiable features (Dell'Amico et al., 2015; Zeng et 
al., 2009).  
Hence, the Monte Carlo method (Dell'Amico et al., 2015) is a suitable 
technique to simulate complex systems in terms of multiple random 
variables. As discussed in Section 1, in this paper, we assess various PSs in 
real uncertain attacking processes to provide suitable PSs for developers and 
software companies. With the help of the Monte Carlo method, we can use 
attack simulation to support the ASSPAM when assess protections. 
2.4 Software Protection Assessment 
As previous discussed, software protection assessment is an essential part of 
software protection (Falcarin et al., 2011). Basile et al. (2013) described a 
unified high-level software attack model to assess software protections for 
developers. Experiments have been designed to assess the effectiveness and 
efficiency of related software protection techniques for code obfuscation 
(Ceccato et al., 2008; Ceccato et al., 2014; Ceccato et al., 2015b).  
Existing protection assessment methods are too specialised or too general to 
cope with uncertain software attack processes and PSs. That is why, to 
overcome this issue, our ASSPAM will be relying on PN based attack 
models and Monte Carlo based attack simulations.  
3. PETRI NET BASED ATTACK MODEL  
In this section, we discuss the PN based attack model for attack simulation, 
which is the basic supporting tool of our ASSPAM, especially for our MCAS.   
3.1 Petri Net based Software Attack Modelling 
PN based attack models are the essential rationale for our assessment 
method in this paper. Generally speaking, PN based attack models represent 
all possible attack paths and attack steps in software attacks, and support the 
attack simulations on these attacks via some extra information.  
   
Based on existing work (Murata et al., 1989; Wang et al., 2013), we present 
our models to describe software attacks for protection assessment: 
Definition 1 PSAM: A PN based Software Attack Model for simulation is a 
five-tuple, PSAM = (P, T, A, EC, AE), where:  
• P is a finite set of states, represented by circles. These states model 
sub-goals reached by an attacker after having executed a number of attack 
steps. P={P0,……,Pn}. 
• T is a finite set of transitions, represented by rectangles. These 
transitions model attack steps, i.e., specific actions undertaken by 
attackers to reach a sub-goal on a path to the final end goal of their attack. 
T={T0,……,Tm}. 
• P∪T≠Ø, P∩T=Ø. 
• A ⊆ {T×P} ∪ {P×T}, is a multi-set of direct arcs, relating sub-goals 
and attack steps. A={A0,……,Al}. 
• EC represents the Effort Consumption. It is a finite set of attacker’s 
effort consumed at each transition in T, where EC={ec0,……,ecm}. It is 
utilised as the preconditions.  
• AE represents the Attacker Effort. It is a finite set of attacker’s effort 
at each state in P, where AE={ae0,……,aen}. Attackers have the capability 
including resources and skills to execute attacks on protected or 
unprotected software. This “capability” is represented with AE and will be 
“consumed” in transitions of attack processes via EC in attack simulations. 
EC and AE will be discussed further in the next subsection, which are the 
key issues to support the attack simulations for our protection assessment.  
 
Figure 1. PN based attack model on a one-time password generator 
As an example of a relevant use case, Figure 1 and Table 1 present relevant 
attack paths on a One-Time Password (OTP) generator (Falcarin et al., 2015) 
by means of PSAM.  It is an important mobile software asset needed to be 
protected: P0 is the starting state in which attackers start to attack the OTP 
software, and P10 is the final state which means a successful attacking. 
   
Specially, this success means that attackers obtain the seed of the OTP 
generator. P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, and P9 are nine intermediate states 
in the attack, corresponding to different sub-goals being reached. T0, T1, T2, 
T3, T4, T5, T6, T8, T9, T10, and T11 are eleven transitions, which describe 
various attack steps (actions) in attack processes, detailed in Table 1.  
Table 1. Attack Table of PN based attack model on a one-time password 
generator  
 Description/Objective Input Output 
T0 Identify PIN section of 
the code 
Original code Piece of code containing 
PIN checking 
T1 Bypass PIN check Piece of code 
containing PIN 
checking 
N/A 
T2 Bypass PIN check Piece of code 
containing PIN 
checking 
PIN obtained 
T3 Set-up for parallel run N/A N/A 
T4 Unlock provisioning 
phase 
Original code Reusable provisioning 
phase (piece of code) 
T5 Fake server setting N/A Server ready 
T6 AES decryption code 
identification 
Fake server (P5) + 
Reusable provisioning 
code (P6) 
Piece of code containing 
the AES deciphering 
algorithm 
T8 Seed recovery AES decryption code 
+ real server 
Seed 
T9 Code pruning for XOR 
localization 
Original code Code fragments 
(executed before OTP 
display) 
T10 XOR chains 
identification 
Code fragments (P8) Sequence of XOR 
operations (piece of 
code) 
T11 Seed recovery Sequence of XOR 
operations 
Seed 
   
PSAM is the basic supporting tool in this paper by providing attack models 
with attack paths and steps, and the part with AE and EC will be introduced 
further in the next subsection to complete the model.  
3.2 Effort Consumption and Attacker Effort  
In this subsection, we detail the Effort Consumption (EC) and the Attacker 
Effort (AE) as the important part of the PSAM to support attack simulation 
for protection assessment particularly.  
In this paper, we use uniform distributions to describe Effort 
Consumption—EC and eci. For each eci, a Maximum boundary—Maxi and a 
Minimum boundary—Mini decide this random variable by the uniform 
distribution in equation (1). 
 ],0[),,(},,...,,...,{ 0 miMaxMinfecececececEC iiimi       (1) 
In equation (1), fec() represents the sampling process of the uniform 
distribution with two boundaries: Mini and Maxi. For example, T0 in the 
OTP attack model is to “Identify the PIN check portion of the code”. Both 
Max0 and Min0 can be set in the attack modelling by users or security 
experts in industry, based on real attack data. After that, ec0 is the random 
variable with the uniform distribution and two boundaries: Max0 and Min0. 
Both boundaries can be increased due to the fact that some protections have 
been applied: for example, when some software protection methods increase 
the code size or the flow complexity, this can make the T0 attack step more 
difficult, which will change the uniform distribution for ec0 with Max0 and 
Min0. These methods could be specific PSs to change ec0. The relations 
between methods and transitions are decided by users, as well as existing 
knowledge. In other words, these Mini and Maxi (and EC) depend on various 
PSs.  
Another concept of PSAM is AE, which represents the current effort of the 
attacker in the state of this attack process. AE can be described by equation 
(2). In this equation, ae0 is the attacker effort before attack processes (in the 
initial place). In this paper, we set ae0 as a random variable with a normal 
distribution. 
},...,,...,{ 0 ni aeaeaeAE                                   (2) 
As introduced in Section 1, since the attacker is one key part of the 
simulation, we will use a normal distribution to represent real uncertain 
attacking processes for one attacker. 
   
Using a PSAM is the basis of our method in this paper, and the attack 
simulation, protection comparison model and protection assessment method 
rely on this.  
In the next section, we will introduce the main content in this paper—
ASSPAM.  
4. ATTACK SIMULATION BASED SOFTWARE 
PROTECTION ASSESSMENT METHOD 
Based on previous discussions, we will introduce our novel ASSPAM in 
three steps: firstly, a MCAS simulates attack processes with PSs, based on 
PN based attack models described in Section 3; secondly, we will introduce 
our ASPCM to compare different PSs based on previous attack simulations; 
lastly, ASSPAM will be introduced based on MCAS and ASPCM to provide 
suitable PSs as the protection assessment results.  
4.1 Monte Carlo based Attack Simulation 
Monte Carlo based Attack Simulation (MCAS) includes two parts: Single 
Attack Process Simulation (SAPS) and Monte Carlo Method. They will be 
introduced in the following. 
4.1.1 Single Attack Process Simulation 
The main process of Single Attack Process Simulation (SAPS) works as 
follows: in one PSAM (as a Directed Acyclic Graph), one attacker will try to 
move from the starting state to the final state. If he/she successes, the result 
of this SAPS is TRUE; otherwise, it is FALSE. It can be viewed as a route 
searching process in the directed acyclic graph. 
In SAPS, in each node, e.g. transition, we use the Passing Probability—PP 
to control the probability that the attacker completes this transition (attack 
step) and reach the next state. 
Passing Probability (PP): A finite set for each transition in T, and ppi ∈ PP, i 
∈ [0,m].  
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In equation (3), eci comes from equation (1), which is the effort 
consumption for each attack step. And aeCUR comes from equation (2), 
which is the current attacker effort in one attack simulation process. If aeCUR 
   
is smaller than eci, the probability is zero, which means that the current 
attacker effort is too low to complete this attack step. Otherwise, if aeCUR is 
not smaller than eci, the passing probability is required to be monotonically 
increasing and in the range of [0, 1) when x is in ),0[  . To match this, we 
use the hyperbolic tangent function: )1()1()tanh( 22 xx eex   . 
Besides, after discussing the pre-conditions of transitions (PP), the actions 
of transitions will focus on the changing on AE and the current place. 
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In equation (4), for transition Ti, on the probability of ppi, aeCUR will be 
subtracted by eci, which means that the attacker passes this transition to 
arrive the next place after this transition. Otherwise (i.e., with probability 1- 
ppi), the attacker needs go back to the previous state to find other paths to 
reach the final state, and aeCUR is still the same.  
Briefly, the SAPS is the basis to Monte Carlo based attack simulation for 
protection assessment by indicating attack processes on PSAM.   
4.1.2 Monte Carlo based Attack Simulation  
Based on this SAPS model, we use the Monte Carlo method to manage the 
SAPS and to provide a randomized simulator emulating the attack processes 
success. The MCAS is illustrated in Figure 2. The key component is our 
SAPS. To run the SAPS, we need to perform an initialisation phase in order 
to build the underlying PN based attack model with EC and AE as 
introduced in Subsection 3.3. The result of each SAPS is of type Boolean. 
Then, the Monte Carlo method executes the SAPS several times. Finally, the 
simulation provides a probability of attack success (the ratio of SAPSs with 
TRUE in all SAPSs).  
Besides, as introduced in Subsection 3.3, specific PSs can decide specific 
ECs in PSAM. Hence, the result of one MCAS process is a probability of 
attack success on one PN based attack model and one PS.  
   
Monte Carlo based Attack 
Simulation
PN based 
Attack Model 
SAPS
Monte Carlo 
method
Simulation 
results 
 
Figure 2. Monte Carlo based Attack Simulation (MCAS) 
In brief, MCAS is the basic tool of ASPCM and ASSPAM.  
4.2 Attack Simulation based Protection Comparison 
Model 
We now present our ASPCM. As indicated in Section 1, the main target of 
ASPCM is to compare PSs with numeric confidences by means of MCAS. 
To reach this aim, we introduce two such values as Compare Confidence 
and Neutral Confidence.  
Based on Subsection 4.1, a probability of attack success is the result of one 
MCAS process with one PN based attack model and one PS. If we compare 
two Protection Solutions, for instance PS-1 and PS-2, we can assume that 
there are two probabilities: p1 and p2 representing the results of MCASs 
being executed based on PS-1 and PS-2 respectively.  
To describe the confidence of the comparison, it is an intuitive way to use 
the difference of these two probabilities, like p2 - p1 under the assertion: PS-
1 is better than PS-2. Besides, to enhance the previous confidence, we 
consider the scenario that these two PSs cannot be distinguished, which 
includes two kinds of events: an attacker can successfully break PS-2 while 
he/she is able to break PS-1; and an attacker cannot break PS-2 while he/she 
is unable to break PS-1. Therefore, the probability of these two events can 
be defined as )1()1( 2121 pppp  , which is equation (6). As such, our 
two confidences are expressed by equations (5) and (6).  
For the assertion: PS-1 is better than PS-2, with confidences including: 
Compare Confidence (CC):  
12 ppCC                                             (5) 
   
Neutral Confidence (NeuC):  
212121 ppppNeuC                              (6) 
Based on results of MCAS—the probabilities of successful attack, the 
ASPCM consider the comparisons based on assertions (PS-1 is better than 
PS-2, or PS-2 is better than PS-1.) with using the corresponding confidence 
values.  
Therefore, based on MCAS, the ASPCM can generate assertions with 
numeric confidences as the comparison results of various PSs. These results 
can be utilised to generate the final protection assessment results of 
ASSPAM, which will be introduced in the next subsection.  
4.3 Attack Simulation based Software Protection 
Assessment Method 
In this subsection, we will introduce our novel Attack Simulation based 
Software Protection Assessment Method (ASSPAM), based on previous 
MCAS and ASPCM. 
PS Knowledge 
Base
ASPCM
MCAS
Analysis and 
Assessment
Attack Simulation based Software 
Protection Assessment Method 
Attack Model 
Base
Rules Set
 
Figure 3. Attack Simulation based Software Protection Assessment Method 
(ASSPAM) 
In Figure 3, we depict our ASSPAM. Component “PS Knowledge Base” 
provides all potential Protection Solutions (PSs) as specific and validated 
empirical accumulations of developers and software companies. Component 
“Attack Model Base” provides all PN based attack models required to be 
assessed. In ASPIRE project (ASPIRE, 2016), these two bases are provided 
by other components, and will be out of the scope of this paper.  
Component “MCAS” is the simulation part of the whole assessment method, 
and it receives PN based attack models from the “Attack Model Base”. 
Component “ASPCM” receives PS candidates from the “PS Knowledge 
Base”, forwards them to the “MCAS”, and executes “MCAS” for comparing 
   
these PS candidates by simulation results. Component “Rules Set” provides 
some specific rules to aid comparing results and generate specific suitable 
PSs as final assessment results. These rules are specified by implementation 
scenarios, and we will deliver some examples in Subsection 5.3. Component 
“Analysis and Assessment” analyses the results of “ASPCM”—comparison 
assertions with confidences and corresponding software attacks to assess PS 
candidates by “Rules Set” for developers and software companies.  
In ASSPAM, firstly, users set the software protection scenarios (selecting 
attack models from the “Attack Model Base”), including which attacks need 
to be considered and the weights on them. Then, the ASPCM can be 
triggered to select potential PSs (from the “PS Knowledge Base”) to be 
compared and assessed. And these potential PSs can be executed by the 
MCAS for generating related probabilities of attacking successful. Based on 
these probabilities, the ASPCM can generate the comparison results between 
PSs with numeric confidences. In the last step, relying on these comparison 
outputs, users can use some specific rules (from the “Rules Set”) to select 
some suitable PSs as the final assessment results of our ASSPAM. These 
results can be used to optimise PSs in the ASPIRE project. 
Besides, to implement our protection assessment method in the real world, 
we need to consider the various scenarios in mobile software protection. For 
example, in one specific assessment scenario (AS), developers could foresee 
that one attack step (transition) requires a peculiar code analysis tool which 
is not available to the majority of potential software attackers. Hence, due to 
this scarcity and the low probability of this risk, developers could omit this 
attack step from the assessment consideration. In other words, it is a part of 
a whole PN based attack model to be considered. In some other ASs, 
different attackers could focus on one special piece of software to jeopardise 
software security, which means that multiple PN based attack models have 
to be considered together in the protection assessment. Hence, our 
assessment method has to support these different protection ASs.  
Based on the previous discussions, we define the AS as equation (7): 
],1[},,,{ SiwSTPSAMAS iii                          (7) 
In this AS, PN based attack models (PSAMs) have been considered and they 
are ordered by index i from 1 to S. STi is the Selected Transitions list in this 
scenario, which includes all transitions selected in this PSAMi. It means that 
a part of this PN model will be included in this AS, as discussed before. wi is 
the weight of this PSAM in the scenario, compared to other PSAMs.   
   
Based on the discussions, we will implement our method on different ASs to 
demonstrate the effective and flexible mobile software protection 
assessment, in the next section.  
In short, the ASSPAM executes as sub-routines the ASCPM and the MCAS to 
assess different PSs under the PSAM in order to obtain suitable assessment 
results in terms of software protection requirements (rules) and ASs.  
5. IMPLEMENTATION 
In this section, we will illustrate our ASSPAM with MCAS and ASPCM by 
implementations and experiments on software protection assessment for 
developers and software companies. Generally speaking, the 
implementation of ASSPAM will be introduced in the order of MCAS, 
ASPCM and ASSPAM. Firstly, we use an example to illustrate the 
implementation on MCAS. Then, we use specific PN based attack models to 
compare various PSs via ASPCM in terms of numeric confidences. Lastly, 
we will analyse the results from ASPCM and generate the suitable PSs with 
rules sets as the final protection assessment results of ASSPAM.  
5.1 Implementation of MCAS 
In this subsection, we use a prototype implementation of MCAS on the OTP 
attack to demonstrate the process of attack simulation. We set the ae0 as a 
normal distribution variable with mean 200 and variance 25.  
Based on the OTP attack model shown in Figure 1, these 11 transitions can 
be classified into four categories: Category 1-locating code pieces (T0, T6, 
T8, T9, T10, and T11), Category 2-bypassing or tampering code pieces (T1, 
T4), Category 3-code injecting (T2, T5), and Category 4-NULL activities 
(T3).  
Table 2. Time Ranges for Various Attack Activities 
 Category 1 Category 2  Category 3   Category 4  
Time Range 
(mins) 
[3, 120] [10, 75] [50, 110] [0, 0] 
Transitions 
in OTP 
T0, T6, T8, 
T9, T10, T11 
T1, T4 T2, T5 T3 
We hosted a student attacking experiment on these attack activities in 
2015/10/23-2015/10/29 at University of East London, involving 
postgraduates (5 persons), PhD candidates (3 persons), and Post-Docs (4 
   
persons). And we can use the time records of this experiment to support the 
setting of EC in each transition in the OTP attack model of Figure 1. For 
example, for the attack activities in Category 2: bypassing or tampering 
code pieces, “attackers” in our experiments spent different times: the 
shortest one is 10 mins, and the longest one is 75 mins. So, we can use these 
“10” and “75” as the boundaries: Mini and Maxi to related transitions: T1 
and T4 as discussed in Subsection 3.3, which be used to build the eci as a 
discrete uniform distribution. Similarly, for each other transition, eci can be 
built on the basis of these shortest and longest times.  
The results of these experiments are summarised in Table 2. As it can be 
observed, the time ranges of attack activities from participants can be used 
to configure these transitions’ EC to demonstrate our method in this paper. 
In future work, we will execute this experiment in different groups of people, 
such as terms of ethic hacker experts, and collect more data to simulate real 
attack processes to match the real world.  
Moreover, the “NULL” attack activities, like “T3” in the OTP attack model 
in Figure 1, are some attack steps which do not include any solid attack 
actions, and are used to represent branching multiple attack paths. Hence, its 
time range is [0, 0], without any time consuming for attackers.  
We therefore obtain the results for MCAS depicted in Figure 4: the 
horizontal axis represents the rounds of SAPS; and the vertical axis is the 
Probability of Successful Attack (PSA). As it can be observed, we can find 
out that by increasing the rounds of SAPS, the probability of successful 
attack becomes stable and is within the interval (2.05%, 2.22%). If we 
simulate the impact of different protection methods with corresponding 
different ECs as discussed in Subsection 3.3, we will obtain different results 
for PS comparison and protection assessment as described in the next 
subsections.  
   
 
Figure 4. Probabilities of Successful Attack by MCAS 
5.2 Implementation on ASCPM 
In this subsection, we discuss a prototype implementation of ASCPM based 
on Subsection 5.1 to demonstrate PS comparison.  
 
Figure 5. PSAs based on different attacks and PSs 
Currently, our “Attack Model Base” includes three PN based attack models 
(one of them is the OTP attack introduced before, another two are attacks on 
White Box Cryptography and SoftVM (Sutter et al., 2015)), and “PS 
Knowledge Base” currently includes ten PSs for protection assessment and 
software development. Specially, these PSs are randomly generated based 
on some existing protections now (Ceccato et al. 2015a) and will be 
improved by real usable PSs. Hence, for all these attacks and PSs, we can 
   
execute MCAS repeatedly and generate the Probabilities of Successful 
Attack (PSAs) depicted in Figure 5. 
 In Figure 5, all PSAs are listed based on different attacks and PSs. It can be 
observed that, there are Attack_1 (the OTP attack), Attack_2 and Attack_3, 
and PSs from PS-1 to PS-10. For each PS, there are corresponding ECs for 
each transition in PN based attack models, as discussed in Subsection 3.3.  
Table 3. Ordered PSs List for Comparison under Each Attack 
Attack PS lists ordered increasingly by PSAs 
Attack_1 PS-8, PS-5, PS-9, PS-2, PS-6, PS-1, PS-10, PS-4, PS-3, PS-7 
Attack_2 PS-4, PS-6, PS-9, PS-1, PS-10, PS-3, PS-2, PS-7, PS-8, PS-5 
Attack_3 PS-5, PS-10, PS-8, PS-7, PS-4, PS-2, PS-6, PS-3, PS-1, PS-9 
Based on the data in Figure 5, we can operate ASPCM with confidences. In 
this part, we will discuss these confidences in different attacks. We can list 
all PSs under each attack increasingly by PSAs as Table 3 to compare. For 
Attack_1, we will compare adjacent PSs pair by pair: PS-8 and PS-5, PS-5 
and PS-9, PS-9 and PS-2, PS-2 and PS-6, PS-6 and PS-1, PS-1 and PS-10, 
PS-10 and PS-4, PS-4 and PS-3, PS-3 and PS-7.  
Figure 6 shows these comparisons when they are operated under Attack_1. 
The vertical coordinate is the value of confidences in [0, 1], and the 
horizontal coordinate is the PS list according to Table 3 Row 1. There are 
two lines represented CC and NeuC between all PSs in ASPCM. For 
instance, for PS-8 and PS-5, the assertion “PS-8 is better than PS-5”, its CC 
is very low and NeuC is quite high. In other words, for the assertion that PS-
8 is better than PS-5, it is not a “positive” assertion. On the other hand, for 
PS-3 and PS-7, its CC may be high “adequately” to support the assertion: 
PS-3 is better than PS-7, to be “positive”. These “positive” and “adequately” 
are decided by specific rules in “Rules Set”, and will be implemented in the 
next subsection.  
   
 
Figure 6. Confidences under Attack_1 
 
Figure 7. Confidences under Attack_2 
 
Figure 8.  Confidences under Attack_3 
   
Similarly, Figure 7 and Figure 8 are comparison confidences under 
Attack_2 and Attack_3.  
In brief, we will introduce the implementation of ASPCM for PS comparison 
in this subsection, based on MCAS.  
5.3 Implementation on ASSPAM 
In this subsection, we discuss ASSPAM’s implementation, especially the 
components of “Analysis and Assessment” and “Rules Set” in Figure 3, 
based on previous subsections.   
As introduced before in Section 4.3, supporting various ASs is an important 
aspect of the implementation of ASSPAM. In this section, we analyse three 
representative ASs: multiple PSAMs (AS-1), a part of one PSAM (AS-2), and 
multiple PSAMs including a part of one PSAM (AS-3).  
5.3.1 AS-1: multiple PSAMs 
As discussed before, in the AS (AS-1), the implementation of ASSPAM 
needs to consider the multiple attack threats in real software developing and 
protecting processes. Specifically, all attacks need to be evaluated together 
by specific weights. In this regard, this AS includes that the weight of 
Attack_1 is 1.0 (this attack is the main concern), the weight of Attack_2 is 
0.0 (Attack_2 will not be considered), and the weight of Attack_3 is 0.3 
(Attack_3 will be considered, but not as important as Attack_1).  Besides, 
the single attack threat can be viewed as a special case: only one attack’s 
weight is 1.0, and other ones are 0.0. 
AS-1 = {Attack_1, FULL transitions, 1.0}, {Attack_2, FULL transitions, 
0.0}, {Attack_3, FULL transitions, 0.3} 
Table 4. Ordered PSs List for Comparison in AS-1 
Scenarios PS lists ordered increasingly by weighted 
sums of PSAs  
AS-1: Attack_1(1.0) + 
Attack_2(0.0) + 
Attack_3(0.3)  
PS-8, PS-5, PS-2, PS-6, PS-10, PS-4, PS-1, PS-
9, PS-3, PS-7 
Hence, in this specific scenario, we can obtain an ordered PS list, 
increasingly ordered by the weighted sum of PSAs of each PS under 
different attacks with these weights as Table 4. The obtained confidences 
are depicted in Figure 9.  
   
 
Figure 9. Comparisons in the specific scenario: AS-1 
In Figure 9, the vertical coordinate is the value of confidences in [0, 1], and 
the horizontal coordinate is the PS list in Table 4 Row 1. There are six lines 
represented CC and NeuC between all PSs in AS-1, Attack_1 and Attack_3 
(which have non-zero weights). This figure illustrates an intuitive and 
detailed picture about all PSs’ assessment in this specific scenario. For 
instance, the assertion that PS-8 is better than PS-5, may be not very 
“positive”. And for PS-2 and PS-1, its CC may be “adequate” to support the 
assertion: PS-2 is better than PS-1, to be “positive”.  
In this regard, different developers and software companies have their own 
unique knowledge about these “positive” and “adequate”, which are the 
specific “Rules Sets” for their own. For example, Rule 1 is “If NeuC is more 
than 0.85, the two PSs are the same in the view of protection assessment”, 
which means “not positive”. And a different one: Rule 2 is “If |CC| is 
smaller than 0.01, and NeuC is more than 0.7, the two PSs are the same”. 
Based on these rules, we can obtain assessment results as Table 5.  
In Table 5, under Rule 1, PS-8, PS-5 and PS-2 are the three best PSs as the 
assessment results. But under Rule 2, PS-8 and PS-5 are the two best PSs as 
the assessment results; PS-6 and PS-10 are the same in the list; the same to 
PS-1 and PS-9. No rule means that only one PS: PS-8 will be selected as the 
assessment result. Therefore, customer-defined rules can provide flexible 
PSs as assessment results, compared to Table 5 Row 1. This flexibility is 
also valuable in our ASPIRE project too. Hence, this flexibility on 
assessment results can provide alternatives for protection assessment in real 
software protection scenarios. 
   
Table 5. Assessment Results depended on Rules in AS-1 
Rules Assessment Results 
No Rule PS-8 > PS-5 > PS-2 > PS-6 > PS-10 > PS-4 > 
 PS-1 > PS-9 > PS-3 > PS-7 
Rule 1 PS-8 = PS-5 = PS-2 > PS-6 > PS-10 > PS-4 >  
PS-1 > PS-9 > PS-3 > PS-7 
Rule 2 PS-8 = PS-5 > PS-2 > PS-6 = PS-10 > PS-4 >  
PS-1 = PS-9 > PS-3 > PS-7 
…… …… 
So far, in the specific AS, our ASSPAM provides Figure 9 and Table 5 as the 
final protection assessment results for developers and software companies: 
Table 5 outlines flexible premier PSs as assessment results; and Figure 9 
shows the details about these PSs, like confidences of PSs’ comparisons.  
5.3.2 AS-2: a part of one PSAM 
As introduced before, due to these changing real risks in mobile software 
protection, one kind of ASs is to remove some “unsuitable” transitions in 
the PSAM to execute the assessment process, which called a part of the 
PSAM in the assessment process.  
In this regard, AS-2 in this subsection focuses on Attack_1 (OTP attack) as 
introduced in Figure 1 and Table 1. Specially, in this PSAM, “T9: Code 
pruning for XOR localization” is a transition requiring that attackers have to 
be high-skilled on binary analysis and very familiar with the specific target 
code piece and AES encryption. Due to the scarcity of these requirements, it 
is reasonable to assume that this specific transition of the PSAM can be 
removed for specific protection assessments. Hence, we can use the 
“modified” PSAM in Figure 10 in this AS.  
 
Figure 10. Modified OTP attack model 
   
In Figure 10, it is the modified OTP attack. Compared to Figure 1, due to 
correlations among transitions, transitions T10 and T11 can be removed 
with T9 together, and the same for the related places: P8 and P9. So, AS-2 is 
an AS included one PSAM: the modified Attack_1.  
AS-2 = {Attack_1, (T0, T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7, T10), 1.0} 
Hence, based on the MCAS and APSCM functions of our assessment method, 
we can obtain the PSAs on this modified attack model in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 11. PSAs based on the modified Attack_1 and PSs 
In Figure 11, all PSAs are listed based on the modified Attack_1 and PSs. 
Compared to the PSAs in Figure 5, we can find out that most of PSAs have 
different decrements. Because one attack path has been removed from the 
attackers’ actions, which mean they have a lower degree of freedom to 
execute a successful attack process. So they have to face lower PSAs.  
Based on the data in Figure 11, we can operate ASPCM with confidences, 
similar to the previous AS. In this part, we will discuss these comparison 
confidences for the modified Attack_1. Based on the PS list in Table 6, we 
will compare adjacent PSs pair by pair: PS-2 and PS-6, PS-6 and PS-9, PS-9 
and PS-5, PS-5 and PS-1, PS-1 and PS-3, PS-3 and PS-10, PS-10 and PS-4, 
PS-4 and PS-8, PS-8 and PS-7.  
Table 6. Ordered PSs List for Comparison under the modified Attack_1 
Attack PS lists ordered increasingly by PSAs 
Modified 
Attack_1 
PS-2, PS-6, PS-9, PS-5, PS-1, PS-3, PS-10, 
PS-4, PS-8, PS-7 
   
Hence, Figure 12 shows the comparisons when different PSs are operated 
under the modified Attack_1. The vertical coordinate is the value of 
confidences in [0, 1], and the horizontal coordinate is the PS list according 
to Table 6.  
 
Figure 12. Confidences under modified Attack_1 (Comparison in AS-2) 
Similar to Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8, in Figure 12, there are two lines 
represented CC and NeuC between all PSs under the modified Attack_1. 
Just similar to the previous discussions, related PSs can be analysed in terms 
of comparisons. For instance, the assertion that PS-2 is better than PS-6, 
may be not very “positive”. And for PS-5 and PS-1, its CC may be 
“adequate” to support the assertion: PS-5 is better than PS-1, to be 
“positive”. Besides, due to that this scenario only includes one attack model 
(modified Attack_1), this Figure 12 can also viewed as the comparison 
figure in this scenario (AS_2) as Figure 9 in the AS-1.  
In this regard, we can use the same “Rule 1” and “Rule 2” in Table 5 to 
understand these “positive” and “adequate”. Rule 1 is “If NeuC is more than 
0.85, the two PSs are the same in the view of protection assessment”. And 
Rule 2 is “If |CC| is smaller than 0.01, and NeuC is more than 0.7, the two 
PSs are the same”. Based on these rules, we can obtain assessment results as 
Table 7.  
In Table 7, under Rule 1, PS-2 is the best PS as the assessment results, 
which is the same to the “No Rule”. And under Rule 2, PS-2 and PS-6 are 
the two best PSs as the assessment results. Therefore, as discussed in the 
previous AS, customer-defined rules can provide flexible PSs as assessment 
results, compared to Table 7 Row 1. 
   
Table 7. Assessment Results depended on Rules in AS-2 
Rules Assessment Results 
No Rule PS-2 > PS-6 > PS-9 > PS-5 > PS-1 > PS-3 > 
 PS-10 > PS-4 > PS-8 > PS-7 
Rule 1 PS-2 > PS-6 > PS-9 > PS-5 > PS-1 > PS-3 > 
 PS-10 > PS-4 > PS-8 > PS-7 
Rule 2 PS-2 = PS-6 > PS-9 > PS-5 > PS-1 > PS-3 > 
 PS-10 > PS-4 > PS-8 > PS-7 
…… …… 
Briefly, in the specific software protection scenario: AS-2, similar to AS-1, 
our ASSPAM provides Figure 12 and Table 7 as the final protection 
assessment results for developers and software companies: Table 7 outlines 
flexible premier PSs as assessment results; and Figure 12 shows the details 
about these PSs, like confidences of PSs’ comparisons.  
5.3.3 AS-3: multiple PSAMs including a part of one PSAM 
In this subsection, we will discuss the last scenario AS-3: multiple PSAMs 
including a part of one PSAM, for the implementation of our ASSPAM. 
Specifically, the specific scenario includes three PSAMs just like AS-1. And 
the only difference is that the Attack_1 is replaced by the modified Attack_1 
introduced in Figure 10. Same to AS-1, the weight of modified Attack_1 is 
1.0, the weight of Attack_2 is 0.0, and the weight of Attack_3 is 0.3.  
AS-3 = {Attack_1, (T0, T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7, T10), 1.0}, {Attack_2, 
FULL transitions, 0.0}, {Attack_3, FULL transitions, 0.3} 
Table 8. Ordered PSs List for Comparison in AS-3 
Scenarios PS lists ordered increasingly by weighted 
sums of PSAs  
AS-3: Modified 
Attack_1(1.0) + 
Attack_2(0.0) + 
Attack_3(0.3)  
PS-2, PS-6, PS-5, PS-3, PS-9, PS-10, PS-1, PS-
4, PS-8, PS-7 
   
Hence, in this specific scenario, we can obtain an ordered PS list, 
increasingly ordered by the weighted sum of PSAs of each PS under 
different attacks with these weights as Table 8. Based on this, we can obtain 
comparison confidences in Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13. Comparisons in the specific scenario: AS-3 
Similar to previous Figure 9, in Figure 13, the vertical coordinate is the 
value of confidences in [0, 1], and the horizontal coordinate is the PS list in 
Table 8. There are six lines represented CC and NeuC between all PSs in 
AS-3, modified Attack_1 and Attack_3. This figure illustrates an intuitive 
and detailed picture about all PSs’ assessment in this specific scenario. For 
example, the assertion that PS-2 is better than PS-6, may be not very 
“positive”. And for PS-5 and PS-3, its CC may be “adequate” to support the 
assertion: PS-5 is better than PS-3, to be “positive”.  
Table 9. Assessment Results depended on Rules in AS-3 
Rules Assessment Results 
No Rule PS-2 > PS-6 > PS-5 > PS-3 > PS-9 > PS-10 > PS-1 
> PS-4 > PS-8 > PS-7 
Rule 1 PS-2 > PS-6 > PS-5 > PS-3 > PS-9 > PS-10 > PS-1 
> PS-4 > PS-8 > PS-7 
Rule 2 PS-2 = PS-6 = PS-5 > PS-3 > PS-9 > PS-10 > PS-1 
> PS-4 > PS-8 > PS-7 
…… …… 
   
Hence, similar to the previous ASs, we can use the same “Rule 1” and “Rule 
2” in Table 5 to understand these “positive” and “adequate”. Rule 1 is “If 
NeuC is more than 0.85, the two PSs are the same in the view of protection 
assessment”. And Rule 2 is “If |CC| is smaller than 0.01, and NeuC is more 
than 0.7, the two PSs are the same”. Based on these rules, we can obtain 
assessment results as Table 9.  
In Table 9, under Rule 1, PS-2 is the best PS as the assessment results, 
which is the same to the “No Rule”. And under Rule 2, PS-2, PS-6 and PS-5 
are the three best PSs as the assessment results. Therefore, as discussed in 
the previous ASs, customer-defined rules can provide flexible PSs as 
assessment results, compared to Table 9 Row 1. 
So far, similar to the previous AS-1 and AS-2, in the specific software 
protection scenario: AS-3, our ASSPAM provides Figure 13 and Table 9 as 
the final protection assessment results for developers and software 
companies: Table 9 outlines flexible premier PSs as assessment results; and 
Figure 13 shows the details about these PSs, like confidences of PSs’ 
comparisons.  
In summary, for real mobile software attack processes, our Attack 
Simulation based Software Protection Assessment method (ASSPAM) with 
Monte Carlo based Attack Simulation (MCAS) and Attack Simulation based 
Protection Comparison Model (ASPCM) can assess complicated Protection 
Solutions (PSs) effectively.   
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Software protection is a critical aspect in software security. In this regard, to 
assess complicated Protection Solutions (PSs) on uncertain mobile attack 
processes, we presented a novel attack simulation based protection 
assessment method called ASSPAM. In this method, Monte Carlo based 
Attack Simulation (MCAS) used PN based attack models to simulate 
attacking processes with different PSs. Based on this attack simulation, a 
novel Attack Simulation based Protection Comparison Model (ASPCM) was 
presented to generate comparisons among potential PSs. Finally, ASSPAM 
was described to assess mobile software protections via the PS comparing 
results of ASPCM and MCAS. We implemented ASSPAM by means of 
software protection assessment processes with various ASs to demonstrate 
that our method could provide suitable assessments for mobile software 
developers.   
For future work, we plan to extend our approach by using software metrics 
to improve the assessment methodology and to search for the optimal 
protection solution in other case studies, such as digital rights management.   
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